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  1Insuring Rural China’s Health? 





Although health is an important factor in economic development, millions of China’s 
rural residents have no medical coverage. Nearly 10 percent of those that were sick in rural 
China consciously did not seek medical care, mostly because of financial constraints. More 
than 25% of rural residents are dissatisfied with their village’s health system. In response to 
this deteriorating situation, a new cooperative medical system (NCMS) was initialized in 
rural China in 2003 by the government. However, after two years of trials, there has been no 
household-based, economic analysis of the program. This paper provides one of the first.   
 
Although where introduced, most rural residents voluntarily participate, there are 
many problems with the program. First, at least in its initial years, targeting has been poor; 
the program has been adopted in richer villages, even though there is a case that there are 
higher medical needs in poorer villages. Also, while the government subsidy pays part of the 
premium, more than 40% criticize the design of the program, including complaints about 
coverage, reimbursement rates and procedures. Based on our survey, the major concern is the 
extremely low reimbursement rates. Instead of up to 30% as promised, only 3% of total 
medical expenses of program participants were paid (6% for inpatient expenses). The 
expected payout of a participating farmer is actually negative; the farmer receives back less 
than what he/she puts in. There also is a gap in understanding of farmers and clinicians 
between the actual implementation of reimbursements and policy.     
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  2Insuring Rural China’s Health? 
An Empirical Analysis of China’s New Cooperative Medical System 
 
Health is an important factor in the process of economic development (Schultz and 
Tansel, 1993). Unfortunately, despite the importance of having a strong health care system 
during the period of economic reform, China’s rural health system has deteriorated.    In the 
socialist era, a cooperative medical system (CMS) was created that provided most rural 
residents with free basic health care services. In the late 1970s, the CMS covered more than 
90 percent of rural population. However, with the advent of the household responsibility 
system there was a widespread collapse of the rural health care network and the CMS (Feng 
et al, 1995). Consequently, a considerable number of the rural residents are not able to afford 
even basic health care (Du, 2001), and the utilization of basic health services by farmers has 
actually fallen. According to a number of community surveys, major illnesses are the number 
one reason causing households to fall into poverty (Yuan and Wang, 1998).   
Recognizing the serious problems in the rural health system, China’s government 
initiated a new rural health program in 2003, the New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS), 
to meet both the outpatient and inpatient needs of rural households, and promised to extend it 
to China’s entire rural area by 2010 (Chen, 2005). In the first year of the program, pilot 
programs were started in 162 counties in 17 provinces. In a typical program, the 
national/provincial and local governments each contributes 10 yuan per capita to the local 
NCMS budget, a total of 20 yuan per capita. The contributions are supposed to be used solely 
for reimbursing health costs, and other administrative and promotion costs are supposed to be 
born from the fiscal resource of the local government. The government has committed more 
than 17 billion yuan to finance the program. 
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also expected to participate on a voluntary basis.    The program participant must pay an 
additional 10 to 15 yuan per year, which makes the NCMS revenue to be 30 to 35 yuan per 
participant per annum. Although the coverage of services varies from place to place, 
according to national policy, inpatient and outpatient services are both supposed to be met.     
Surprisingly, despite such an ambitious goal and the prospect of such a huge outlay of 
funds, there has been almost no effort by economists reported in the literature that evaluates 
China’s NCMS. There is no where in the empirical economic literature outside of China in 
which the program is evaluated.    Studies inside China are almost never based on household 
data (e.g., Hu, 2004; Gu and Fang, 2004; Zhang, et al., 2004).   
The overall goal of our paper is to provide one of the first national household 
survey-based evaluations in the economics literature of the NCMS. The specific objectives 
include: (a) to seek to describe the NCMS and focus mainly on the need for health insurance, 
and the coverage and targeting of the program, and (b) to examine the participation of 
farmers in the program and try to assess some of the strength and weaknesses of NCMS.   
We restrict our analysis to data the reflects the perspective of farmers and clinicians.   
Data 
The data are from the survey led by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy in 
collaboration with the University of California, Davis and the University of Toronto.    The 
survey was conducted in early 2005 from a randomly selected, almost nationally 
representative sample of 101 rural villages in 5 provinces of China (Jiangsu, Hebei, Jilin, 
Sichuan and Shaanxi); 808 sample households were chosen randomly from the 101 villages.     
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participation in the NCMS, health status and record in seeking medical attention. We asked 
whether NCMS was available in their villages and, if so, whether each household member 
participated or not. The respondents also provided information on coverage of the NCMS 
(the program’s administrative details and rules and regulations) as well as on information on 
the reason why certain individuals did not participate in the program. The questionnaire 
included a special block that focused on collecting individual self-reported health 
information. In particular, each respondent was asked whether or not they became ill during 
the previous year and how (and if) they responded (by seeking outpatient, inpatient or no 
medical care). All expenses that the household spent on medical care were also solicited. 
Need for Health Insurance Programs 
In China’s post-reform rural economy, there is no doubt that many rural households 
could benefit from a high quality, effective health insurance program. According to our data, 
approximately 75 percent of all sample individuals self-reported being ill during 2004; 25 
percent of all individuals self-reported to be chronically ill (e.g., high blood pressure or back 
problems). About 15 percent of all sample individuals self-reported being seriously ill.   
Even though 91 percent of those that were ill sought some type of medical care, 9 percent 
stating that they made a conscious decision not to seek medical care.   
Our data also suggest that many individuals that self-reported having a serious illness 
can not afford being hospitalized. In our entire sample, of the 316 individuals self-reported 
being serious illness but did not stay in hospital, there were many reasons for not doing so. 
For example, seven percent said they lived too far from the hospital, five percent said when 
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disease was incurable and decided against seeking any further treatment. Although financial 
constraints are part of the reasons in these categories, by far, however, of those who did not 
seek medical care, the most (56 percent) cited financial problems directly.   
The inability to afford medical care by those who are sick with serious illness is a 
particular problem for those individuals living in poor areas. While only 34 percent of those 
living in the richest 20 percent of the villages in the sample (that is the richest quintile) stated 
that the reason for not being hospitalized was that could not afford to pay for medical care, 
over half of those in the poorest quintile of villages did so. The seriousness of the problem is 
true especially when noting that significantly more than 20 percent of the individuals that did 
not stay as inpatient (71 of 316) came from the poorest 20 percent of the villages.     
Availability and Participation in the New Cooperative Medical System 
Although our data show that there is currently a great need for NCMS, as of the end 
of 2004 the program still had not spread very far and did not appear to be targeted very well. 
Only 24 of the 101 sample villages were covered by the NCMS in 2004. Of the 3225 
individuals that we surveyed, only 783 (or 24 percent of the sample) were living in covered 
villages (henceforth called covered individuals). The level of coverage of our sample, in fact, 
is close to the national number. According to National Statistics Bureau, by the end of 2004, 
23 percent of individuals were covered by NCMS (NSB, 2005).   
Because of the voluntary nature of the program, however, coverage does not equal 
participation. Indeed, in our sample, of the 783 covered individuals, 617 (79 percent) 
participated. This number is again close to the national average of 75 percent that officially 
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voluntary, we also asked each respondent if participation was their own decision. In fact, in 
almost all cases (93 percent) respondents told us that they made their own decision.     
Coverage in the program was not only modest in the initial years of NCMS, it also 
arguably emerged first in those areas that needed it the least. For example, of the 24 villages 
that implemented the program in our sample, only 4 were from outside of Jiangsu, our 
sample’s richest province. Only 6 percent of the sample individuals outside of Jiangsu were 
covered by the end of 2004. More importantly, when we divide the sample villages between 
those covered by NCMS and those not, it can been seen that there are more people sick in the 
non-covered villages (76 percent vs. 73 percent) and non-covered villages have more 
individuals that are chronically (27 percent vs. 21 percent) and more that are seriously ill (16 
percent vs. 12 percent). Based on this analysis, an argument can be made that NCMS is not 
well targeted: the rural areas that have received coverage earlier are those that least need it.     
The Decision Not to Participate 
Although the participation rate is nearly 80 percent, there were still 166 covered 
individuals who decided not to be part of NCMS. We were interested in finding out in the 
face of high demand for rural health insurance why it was that 21 percent of covered 
individuals decided not to participate. In particular, we wanted to know if non-participation 
was mainly due to program design problems or due to idiosyncratic factors of individual (that 
is, personal factors). 
In fact, our data show that personal factors account for 31 percent of cases in which 
covered individuals decided not to participate, including eight percent they did not think they 
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did not believe the government would carry through with their promises.   
Although there may be little the NCMS officials can do about these personal reasons, 
an even greater share of the non-participants (46%) claimed they decided not to participate 
because they were displeased with certain design features of NCMS.    Above all, 23 percent 
of non-participants stated that they were away from home most of the year working as 
migrants and NCMS only reimbursed expenses in local hospitals and clinics, therefore they 
decided it was not worth it to participate. In addition, 16 percent were not happy with the 
direct design of the program locally (six percent said the reimbursement rate was too low; 
five percent said covered services were too expensive and five percent said the 
reimbursement procedures were too complicated). Interestingly, only seven percent of the 
individuals said the program was too expensive. Hence, our data suggest that fundamental 
design problems (the location of treatment and specific design features), not personal factors 
or price, were most responsible for discouraging participation.   
Implementation of NCMS 
While it is possible to interpret NCMS as being successful enough in design and 
concept to attract most individuals in covered villages (though not targeting), it is difficult to 
provide a positive evaluation for the implementation of the program in the sample villages 
during 2004. In this section we examine two key problems with the program. First, we 
explore how well individuals and clinicians in the covered villages understand the rules of 
the program. Second, we illustrate why the program’s payout profile suggests that the 
program will likely soon be facing a much less enthusiastic clientele.   
  8Misperceptions of Covered Services 
One of the most fundamental problems is that there is a lot of misperception about the 
nature and scope of NCMS. This can be clearly seen when comparing responses among the 
program’s stakeholders—farmers, clinicians and program officials—regarding one dimension 
of the design of the program: the coverage of services (Table 1). According to the official 
documents created and released by all the local NCMS office at the county level and passed 
onto township officials and village leaders in our sample area, participants in NCMS are 
allowed to make claims for both “doctor visits” and “hospital stays” (Panel A). According to 
interviews with the county officials, there are no exceptions—doctor visits and/or hospital 
stays are covered under the program. However, according to our data, farmers do not 
understand this (Panel B). Only 43 percent of participating individuals in NCMS believe both 
doctor visits and hospital stays are covered. In contrast, 14 percent believe only expenses 
associated with doctor visits can be reimbursed; 34 percent believe only expenses with 
hospital stays can be reimbursed. Nine percent of individuals had no idea of the services 
covered by the program. Hence, when comparing the perception of participants with those of 
the program literature, we see there is a wide gap in the understanding of the program. 
Clinician’s understanding of the scope of the services covered by the program are not 
much better (assuming the official literature is correct—Panel C). Only 57 percent of 
clinicians understood both doctor’s visits and hospital stays were covered. The remaining 
clinicians believed either only doctor visits were covered (7 percent); or only hospital stays 
(25 percent); and 11 percent did not know. Interestingly, although in all cases the county 
NCMS office said that valid doctor visit expenses incurred could be reimbursed (including 
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For example, clinicians in 17 out of 28 village clinics told us that expenses incurred on 
doctor visits could not be reimbursed by participating individuals. Moreover, clinicians in 11 
out of 28 village clinics reported that NCMS can not be used at all by their patients. 
So what is the conclusion and implication of these findings? Clearly, if there really is 
such a wide gap between the actual program parameters and the understanding of individuals 
and clinicians, a serious promotion effort is needed. Alternatively, it is possible that it is not 
promotion that is needed, but rather a more careful implementation because it could be that, 
in fact, individuals and clinicians are replying as they actually see the program being 
implemented. In other words, their perception of the program is actually different from the 
official literature on the design of the program, but the perceptions of individuals and 
clinicians may be an accurate representation of the way NCMS is being executed 
on-the-ground.  
Effectiveness of Program and Low Payout Rates 
When examining the reasons why people are afflicted with an illness that requires 
hospitalization decline, we find a pattern of results that at first examination appears to show 
that participating individuals in covered villages are benefiting from NCMS. We carry out 
this exercise by comparing those in covered villages, both participating and non-participating 
individuals and those in non-covered villages (Table 2). Our data show only 35 percent of 
participating individuals said that they did not seek hospitalization even though it was 
necessary due to financial difficulties. In contrast, 67 percent of non-participating in covered 
villages and 60 percent of those in non-covered villages claimed they could not afford 
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overcome financial difficulties when facing the charges associated with hospitalization. 
Closer examination, however, casts doubt on such an interpretation. First, although 67 
percent of non-participants in covered areas claimed they could not afford to pay 
hospitalization charges, it should be remembered that non-participants were relatively young 
and often had fewer assets. Although the percentage is high, it is over a small base (only 9 
individuals were in such a category). Therefore, it appears as if the story of non-participants 
is that they believe, and are correct in believing, that they are less in need of health insurance. 
However, as seen, when they face high health costs, they are often not able to meet them and 
often choose to forgo them. In fact, it may be that because usage of such coverage would not 
be high, but its benefit per usage may be high (since providing younger people with better 
human capital is likely to have relatively high social returns) that programs should be 
developed to target the young and make it more attractive for them to participate. 
Second, and most damning to the program, when examining the level of payout of 
NCMS, it is almost certain that the support from the program is NOT reducing the share of 
participating individuals that are not able to afford health care when needed. Table 3 shows 
the extremely low payout rates of NCMS during 2004. On average, participating individuals 
incurred 417 yuan of health expenditures, of which individuals financed 367 yuan (88 
percent) out of current income (or savings). They borrowed from relatives for six percent and 
covered two percent by other means. In other words, 97 percent of health expenditures of 
individuals that were participating in NCMS were covered by their own income, savings or 
borrowing. Only three percent was paid out by NCMS.   
  11Such a low cost coverage by NCMS means, of course, that the expected payout for 
the average individual is low, only 14 yuan in 2004. In fact, if the single highest payout 
(2400 yuan) was excluded, the average expected payout was only 11 yuan. When compared 
to what farmers invested (on average 12 yuan per person—10 yuan in some villages; 15 yuan 
in others), we see that the expected payout is negative (if we exclude the single outlier). In 
other words, when the average farmer pays out 12 yuan in a year, based on the experience of 
2004, he/she should expect to receive back 11 yuan. Obviously, such a payout rate would not 
be unexpected in a none-subsidized commercially driven system. But as discussed above, 
NCMS is supposed to provide subsidized rural health insurance to farmers which should 
mean, on average, they make a positive amount on their investment. We believe if this low 
payout rate continues, individuals will soon catch on and show less enthusiasm for the 
program. 
The payout on hospitalization supports the findings on payouts in general. Although 
according to the information on NCMS provided by county officials, when individuals incur 
large expenses (e.g., when they need hospitalization), they should be able to be reimbursed 
for 30 percent of their total expenses. However, according to our data, on average the typical 
individual that is hospitalized only is reimbursed for six percent of his/her expenses. If we 
exclude the one large payout (of 2400 yuan), the average reimbursements for hospitalization 
equal four percent. Clearly, the program is not delivering on its promises. 
From the examination of Table 3, it is clear that NCMS is not behind the findings in 
Table 2. The average payouts are so low (about four percent, on average), it is inconceivable 
that insurance reimbursements are allowing participating individuals in covered areas to seek 
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hospital care when they need it. Instead, it is likely due to the composition of those in 
covered areas. When comparing the incomes of participants in covered areas, 
non-participants in covered areas and individuals in non-covered areas, the participants are 
by far the wealthiest in terms of current earnings and assets (e.g. housing asset of 12130 yuan 
per capita for participants; 8400 yuan per capita for non-participants; and 6881yuan per 
capita for individuals living in non-covered areas). In other words, the correlation between 
participation and ability to seek hospitalization when needed is spurious. We do not believe 
NCMS plays a very important role. 
Conclusions 
In this study, we surveyed 808 rural households in China in 2004, a total of 3225 
individuals, to investigate the newly launched NCMS from the perspective of the farmer.   
We can conclude that there is a strong need in medical coverage in rural areas, especially low 
income regions. The initial NCMS programs have attracted high levels of participation in 
counties where available. The low personal contribution made possible by the government’s 
subsidy of the premium appears to be an important factor. 
However, the primary concerns we have are that the reimbursement rate is too low, 
the most needed low income regions are not covered by the program yet, and there exists a 
wise misunderstanding on the reimbursement policies by farmers and rural clinicians. It is 
necessary for the NCMS to improve the design and the actual implementation of the policy in 
order to keep farmers interested in the program and to meet its goal of providing rural 
residents, especially the poor, with adequate medical coverage.  
Table 1. Perceptional Differences among Individuals, Clinicians and Published Rules about Scope of Reimbursable Medical Expenses in 
the NCMS, 2004. 
Published Rules from the 
Office in Charge of NCMS 
(Panel A) 
 
Responses by Individuals in 
the Sample 
(Panel B) 
Responses by Clinicians in 
the Sample 
(Panel C) 













Number of Observations (Individuals/Clinicians/Bureaus)  24 100    617  100  28 100 
      Only Reimburses for Outpatient Expenses    --  --    89  14  2  7 
      Only Reimbursing Inpatient Expenses  --  --    208  34  7  25 
      Reimburses for Both Outpatient and Inpatient Expense    24  100    267  43  16  57 
   Did  Not  Know    --  --    53  9  3  11 
Data source:    Authors’ data. 
a. Published Rules from the Office in Charge of NCMS is obtainable from local bureaus of health. 
b. Since five villages had two clinics and one village did not have a clinic, the total number of reporting clinics in the villages with NCMS exceeded 24.  
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Individuals in Covered Villages 
Participating  Non-Participating 
  Individuals in Non-Covered 














Total  49  100  9  100  258  100 
Can Not Afford Financially  17  35  6  67  154  60 
Individual Lives Too Far from Hospital  4  8  0  0  17  7 
Hospital Beds Not Available  9  18  1  11  6  2 
Chronic Illness is Untreatable  17  35  2  22  75  29 
Other  2  4  0  0  6  2 
Data source:    Authors’ data.
 





Table 3.    Source of Financing for Expenditures on Medical Treatment in 2004   
 Expenditures 
(yuan) 




Minimum Value of 
Expenditures 
Maximum Value of 
Expenditures 
All Individuals in Sample who are Covered by NCMS     
Total health expenditure (per capita) in 2004  417  100  1369  0  23500 
Reimbursed by NCMS  14  3  113  0  2400 
From current earnings of savings  367  88  1131  0  17500 
Financed by borrowing (loan)  26  6  349  0  8000 
Financed by selling off asset  0  0  0  0  0 
Other source of financing
 b 10  2 242 0  6000 
  Covered In-patients by Individuals in Sample who Sought In-patient Care    
Total health expenditure (per capita) in 2004  3619  100  4310  80  23500 
Reimbursed by NCMS  225  6  465  0  2400 
From current earnings of savings  3027  84  3392  80  17500 
Financed by borrowing (loan)  167  5  531  0  2000 
Financed by selling off asset  0  0  0  0  0 
Other source of financing
 b 200  6 1095 0 6000 
a Individuals in this section include all of those covered by NCMS, including a.) Those that were in-patients (“saw a doctor or clinician”); b.) Those that were out-patients (“went to hospital or 
township health center”); c.) Those that were sick but did not seek medical treatment; d.) Those that were not sick, the number of observations is 617. 
Data source:    Authors’ data.
 
b “Other Sources of Financing” includes a.) Financed by relatives b.) Reimbursed by other health insurance c.) etc. 
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